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BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM. CEO RELATIVE POWER AND FINANCIAL 
RETURNS IN BRAZIL1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in 
Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top 
management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of 
independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent 
compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial 
return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two 
variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in 
the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough 
outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. 
 
Keywords 
Corporate governance, control, board of directors. 
 
 
CONSELHO DIRETOR E EQUIPE DE ALTO NÍVEL ADMINISTRATIVO. PODER RELATIVO DO CEO E 
RETORNOS FINANCEIROS NO BRASIL 
 
RESUMO 
Este artigo investiga se as empresas com um controle mais rigoroso de monitoramento performam melhor que 
outras empresas. O artigo compara 116 empresas no que diz respeito ao seu nível de independência entre a 
equipe de alto nível administrativo e o conselho diretor medida por quatro parâmetros: a percentagem de 
conselheiros independentes no conselho, a separação de CEO e presidente, a adoção de compensações 
contingentes e a percentagem de investidores institucionais na estrutura de propriedade - e seu retorno 
financeiro medido em termos retorno sobre ativos (ROA) em relação aos resultados trimestais de 2012. Duas 
variáveis (percentual de diretores externos e percentual de participação de investidores institucionais) são 
significativos na regressão. Este trabalho fornece evidências de que o aumento da governança através da 
estrutura formal fora do conselhor diretor e apropriação por parte dos investidores institucionais pode realmente 
levar a pior performance financeira. 
 
Palavras-Chave 
Governança corporativa, controle e conselho diretor. 
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1  Introduction 
Derived from the separation of ownership and control, the principal-agent has arisen as an 
important issue that organizations face nowadays (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to the agency 
theory, it relates to the fact that shareholders from corporations must nominate someone who will 
supposedly behave on their best interest and, therefore, act in such a way that maximizes 
shareholders´ value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, this situation triggers a number of issues, 
such as information asymmetry, different risk preferences and wrongly intended behavior.  
Bearing in mind this critical situation, corporations have started to find ways to solve or 
attenuate this problem. The field of Corporate Governance represents the ultimate attempt to 
protect shareholders´ interest from CEOs biased and wrongly intended behavior. Over the last 
decade corporate governance topics have received enormous attention due to a number of 
governance failures, including top leading companies in their segments, such as Enron and Parmalat 
(Cai, Liu, & Qian, 2002; Marcel & Cowen, 2014).  
In Brazil several studies show a growing interest and concern on Corporate Governance such as 
Pinto and Lean (2013) on ownership concentration and board compensation, Okimura, Silveira and 
Rocha (2007) on the relationship between control and ownership structure, value and performance 
of Brazilian public companies listed in the São Paulo Stock Exchange and Caixe and Krauter (2013) 
on ownership and control concentration and corporate market value.  
Derived from corporate governance failures, and supported by theoretical background, many 
firms have engaged in governance structure systems based on controlling and monitoring, aiming at 
protecting shareholders ‘interests. However, as Langevoort (2001) argues, this model of corporate 
governance has been characterized as largely deficient. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between governance structures 
perceived to be stricter – in respect to the level of control and monitor – and the financial return of 
the companies. The underlying understanding is that not necessarily more sophisticated governance 
structures in regard to control will lead to higher financial return, given that some other aspects, 
such as collaboration and trust among the top management team and the board of directors 
although crucial, are still neglected (Zahra & Pearce, 1990; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007).  
This article argues that companies with a more rigid corporate governance structure in respect 
to control and monitor do not necessarily outperform companies with less rigid corporate 
governance structure. Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or CVM) and the Brazilian 
Corporate Governance Institute (Instituto Brasileiro de Governaça Corporativa, or IBCG) promote 
board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of its governance 
mechanism.  
The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 Brazilian companies in respect to 
the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that 
measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the 
separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of 
institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms 
return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. 
This paper is structured in the following manner: first, it provides an extensive literature review 
on the relevant topics, namely, agency theory, corporate governance, board of directors and the 
concept of CEO relative power. Secondly, it explains the methodology and how the data is 
constructed. Presented that, the paper addresses the results obtained from the data gathering, 
being the latter structured in three sub sections: sample overview, regression analysis with the 
developed scale for this paper, and finally regression analysis with the independent variables being 
transformed into dummy variables. Lastly, conclusions are drawn, as well as the limitations and 
suggestion for future researches.  
 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1  The Agency Problem 
Agency costs has been an important concern in Business Administration in a long time (Wilson, 
1968; Ross, 1973). The separation of ownership and control has deeply affected the paradigm of 
owner-manager, being it substituted by what we know as professionalized management. Therefore, 
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according to Fama (1980), the agency problem arises exactly from the separation of two functions 
usually attributed to the entrepreneur, namely risk bearing and management.  
The first element to understand the principal-agent problem is grounded on the arena of 
contractual relationships. As Fama and Jensen (1983) explains, “an organization is the nexus of 
contracts, written and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and customers” (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983, p. 302). Namely the “rules of the game” specify the rights of each agent in the 
organization, establish the performance criteria against which individuals will be appraised and set 
up the expected payoff for a combination of firm value and observed behavior of each agent.   
However, as Fama and Jensen (1983) argue, the main source of agency problems arises 
exactly because contracts cannot be costless written and enforced. In this context, agency costs 
refer to the lost associated with structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts between 
agents with conflicting interests. Therefore, as not all the potential situations that may occur when 
managing a company can be anticipated and included in the contract between managers and 
owners, there is the inevitable principal-agent problem that must to be solved via different 
mechanism, such as Corporate Governance instruments (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
Within this scope, Hart (1995) explains in details that there are three costs that are particularly 
relevant. First, there is the cost of thinking about all the different eventualities that can occur while 
the contract is still in vigor. Second, there is the cost of negotiating with others about the contracts. 
Third, there is the cost of translating contracts into legal objects that could enforced by a third party 
in the case of a dispute. Therefore, in his understanding, corporate governance is merely 
“mechanisms for making decisions that have not been specified in the initial contract” (Hart, 1995, 
p. 680).  
From the perspective that there are innumerous conflicts between the two characters in the 
context – principal and agent – some researchers have grounded agency theory on instruments that 
align interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) understanding is that any managerial behavior can be 
determined by the incentives provided to the managers. In other word, the authors believe that 
simple alterations in the wage and incentive package are sufficient to resolve any problem regarding 
appropriate and expected behavior from the management team. Yet, this theory does not blind 
closely with reality, as individuals cannot be narrowed down to an economic perspective, and social, 
political, psychological spheres must also be considered (Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003).  
According to Eisenhardt  (1989), agency theory is concerned with solving two issues. First, it 
focuses on the fact that the principal cannot closely verify what the agent is doing. The second issue 
relates to the fact that agent and principal have different risk preferences, and therefore the optimal 
solution for one might not represent the optimal solution for the other. Therefore, as can be noticed 
by the nature of the issues, this perspective considers that the most important element is 
determining the optimal contract between principal and agent. This optimal contract varies 
according to risk aversion and information level between principal and agent.  
However, although mathematically correct in many cases, there are a wide range of 
shortcomings that is triggered from aligning interests through mainly financial incentives. Firstly, 
very often there is not a direct and straight link between managers’ effort and the firm performance. 
In other words, as Shavell (1979) suggests that when there is a noise between manager´s marginal 
product - the expected value from his/her actions cannot be traced unambiguously and costlessly to 
the manager’s actions – risk adverse managers will always choose to share part of the uncertainty in 
the evaluation of his performance with the firm’s risk bearers.  
Secondly, CEO´s expected behavior cannot always be correctly translated to numbers. 
Positivist agency theory argues that contracts must be outcome-based, in the sense that executives 
are compensated according to observed level of outcome. However, as Eisenhardt (1989) explains, 
there are many pitfalls when this theory is mirrored to the reality. Executives of modern corporations 
must perform in different directions (socially, financially, environmentally, etc.) and therefore a 
single measure might be misleading regarding his expected behavior. Additionally, the 
programmability of the agent’s task influence the effectiveness of outcome based contracts. The 
relationship between programmability and outcome based contract effectiveness is directly 
proportional, in the sense that the higher the programmability of a specific task, the more effective 
will be aligning interest trough outcome-based contracts. Bringing this theory to reality, it is 
comprehensible that outcome-based contracts will not be effective to shape CEOs’ behavior, as their 
task has an extremely low level of programmability and depends on a myriad of aspects, such as 
world economy, business environment, etc.  
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Aiming at overcoming all the listed issues related to aligning interests through incentive 
packages, the third key element of agency theory is observation. The principal, in this context, wants 
to understand whether the agent is shrinking (referring to the problem of moral hazard, in which 
managers lack of effort is observable) or striving to achieve positive outcomes. The problem, 
however, is that the principal will never be able to closely observe the agent so that he/she will feel 
forced to act according to expected behavior. In other words, he/she can find a way to masked 
efforts and continue with a shrinking attitude. Therefore, as Eisenhardt (1989) proposes, principals 
can invest in information systems, such as budgeting, reporting, etc, to increase vigilance on the 
agent. Saltaji (2013) reviewing the recent literature recognizes five solutions to agency problems: 
a)managerial labor market; b) corporate boards; c) corporate financial policy; d) block holders and 
institutional investors; e) market for corporate control; f) managerial remuneration. On the other 
hand, Lan and Heracleous (2010) argue that the growing body of literature proposing solutions to 
mitigate agency problems has failed to support their efficacy. 
 
2.2  Corporate Governance  
Based on the assumption that managers are self-interested and would deviate whenever 
possible from actions that benefit residual claimants, economists have struggled to understand how 
organizations have managed to survive despite the poor and dishonest management. The first 
plausible suggestion to solve this problem was presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who 
distinctively proposed the initial concept of corporate governance.  
The amount of corporate governance research has increased dramatically during the last 
decade: searching for this term in the Social Sciences Research Network leads to more than 10.300 
results. This ultimately shows the increasing relevance that both academic and managerial arenas 
give to the field corporate governance. The increasing importance of corporate governance is noted 
even in several emerging markets (Claessens & Burcin, 2013). Daily, Dalton and Canella (2003, p. 
371) define governance as “the determination of the broad uses which organizational resources will 
be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in organizations”. 
Corporate Governance mechanisms aim at assuring to shareholders that managers will strive to 
achieve outcomes that are aligned with shareholders’ interest (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Williamson, 
1996).   
In a broad definition, according to Jensen (1993), there are four control forces operating on the 
corporation to resolve the problems caused by conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. They are: (i) legal, political and regulatory systems, (ii) product and factor markets, (iii) 
capital markets and (iv) internal control systems headed by the board of directors. The author 
suggests that while the first force is too blunt and cannot resolve properly inefficiencies generated 
by poor management, the second force is usually too late when disciplines the effects, as very often 
companies cannot be saved from an imminent failure. Therefore, the field of Corporate Governance 
focuses exclusively on the third and forth governance structures, namely internal and external 
mechanism to protect shareholders ‘interest. 
The evolution of an active market for corporate control has been accompanied by an increase 
in the sophistication and variety of managerial defense tactics against hostile suitors. Walsh and 
Seward (1990), by pointing out this phenomenon, have indirectly suggested that all the limitation of 
the current external governance structure, emphasizes the relevance of internal corporate 
governance protecting mechanisms.  
In this context, internal governance mechanisms are the second set of tools that shareholders 
have at their disposal. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that some internal governance structures 
are an effectively structured board, compensation packages that align interests and participation of 
institutional investors in the board. The authors advocate that the most important internal control 
mechanism is, however, the board of directors, arguing that it is central not only to the role of 
controlling managers but, also extremely relevant due to its knowledge pool and strategic 
orientation.  
So far the main focus of studies of corporate governance in Brazil has been its relation to 
company’s performance and valuation at the Brazilian stock-market (Silveira, Barros & Famá, 2006; 
Oliveira Neto, Medeiros & Queiroz, 2012; Rossoni & Machado da Silva, 2013). 
 
 
  
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil 
 
http://revistas.facecla.com.br/index.php/recadm/ 
doi: 10.5329/RECADM.2014023 361 
FACECLA  |  Campo Largo – PR, Brasil. 
RECADM  |  v. 13  |  n. 3  |  p. 356-371  |  Set-Dez/2014. 
 
2.3  Board of Directors 
In order to understand some point of debate regarding the board of directors, it is useful to 
adopt Fama and Jensen (1983) decision process framework. Differently than entrepreneurial firms, in 
which decisions are very often taken by a limited number of people if not a single one, in modern 
corporations there is a complex decision process. As the authors suggest, it consists basically on four 
steps: (i) initiation, which refers to proposing resources utilization and structuring contracts; (ii) 
ratification, which refers to the choice of decisions to be implemented; (iii) implementation and (iv) 
monitoring, which refers to measuring the performance of the decision agents and implementing 
rewards.  
Having this framework in mind, the relevant questions to be answered are: in which of the four 
steps should the board of directors take part? Should it focus on the most commented one of 
monitoring or should it go further and also participate in the initiation and ratification of strategies 
and decisions?  
The authors (Fama & Jensen, 1983) suggest that for an effective system for decision control, 
the management team should be focused on initiating and implementing, while board of directors – 
or any third party control body – should allocate efforts to ratify decisions and monitor them. 
Additionally, Clark (1986) argues that it is still unrealistic to view directors as making a significant 
impact on business policy decisions. As he says, directors simply approve them and occasionally 
offer advice or raise probing questions.  In the same line of reasoning, Westphal and Fredrickson 
(2001) believe that while the board of directors is mainly focused on the financial control – as their 
responsibility is to protect shareholders and assure their financial right – the strategic control is 
generally reserved for executives. Even though some strategic changes are influenced by the 
selection of a new CEO – and therefore the board would have greater influence determining the new 
strategic path – it is widely accepted that boards only ratify decision of managers and very rarely 
initiate an alteration on their own (Westphal, 1999). 
Derived from this situation, many problems arise from the relationship of board of directors and 
top management team.  Firstly, information asymmetry represents a crucial challenge that needs to 
be overcome in order to the board be able to perform both counseling and monitoring of the 
management team. Information asymmetry refers to the fact that boards typically possess far less 
information than CEOs (Nowak & McCabe, 2003). Therefore, the quality of the information boards 
hold compared to the quality of information the top management possess can be seen a good 
predictor for determining the level of monitoring that the first is able to deploy when disciplining the 
latter. Additionally, given that advice seeking reduces information asymmetry and results in more 
informed boards (Westphal, 1999), one could assume that boards more engaged in strategic 
definition tasks could perform better both controlling task – as it has more information – and 
counseling, as it holds more firm specific knowledge.  
In the agency theory, information is regarded as a commodity, in the way that it has a cost and 
can be purchased (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, as this is clearly not the case in real organizational 
situations, challenges related from information asymmetry are undeniable. Firstly, given that 
knowledge is costly to transfer and the whole comprehension of the company and aggregated 
information for effective decisions are not concentrated in one single person in modern organizations 
– differently than entrepreneur firms – it leads to ineffective firms’ structure and strategic paths. 
Secondly, managers that are daily immersed in the firm’s context will naturally have more 
information than board members, who participate less frequently. Hence, managers could deviate 
from the interests of the residual claimants without being easily noticed by the board members.  
Bearing all in mind, the evolution of board’s role in more strategic manners is noticeable. 
Initially, boards were widely perceived as passive, functioning only as rubber stamps of managerial 
choices (Bavly, 1985). Following a series of corporate bankruptcies in the mid 1970s, and 
intensifying international competition, the importance of the strategic contribution of boards was 
reasserted (Zahra & Pearce, 1990).  
From this evolution, some drawbacks should also be pointed out. As the board cooperates more 
closely with the top management team, there are risks associated with entrenchment, lacking 
independence to successfully monitor executives. Although the board of directors is the ultimate 
decision body, CEOs and top management team can find shortcuts to influence board members  
The literature also points out that the board is an important tool to improve companies 
performance (Macus, 2008; Anderson, Melanson, & Maly, 2007). Casto et al (2009), for example, has 
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found that synergy between board of directors and top management team is able to generate 
strategic changes 
 
2. 4  CEO Relative Power 
Corporate governance literature has concentrated much of attention in defining the relative 
CEO power (Nyberg et al, 2010), as it aims to understand the link between decreasing independence 
of the board to the firm´s performance. In this context, some information is used when assessing the 
level of independence of the board. Following, four of them are discussed more deeply.  
Outside directors refer to executives that are not involved in the daily operations of the 
company. It is widely agreed that boards with more independent directors have stronger monitoring 
capabilities (Weisbach, 1988; Borokhovic & Parrino, 1996; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that because outside directors have incentives to develop 
reputation as experts in decision control, they are less likely to collude with internal managers and 
adopt decisions that deviate from the interest of the residual claimants. In this context, given that 
their human capital value will depend on the performance of the firms they participate in the board, 
they have incentives to behave properly. Hence, one could assume that boards composed with more 
outside directors will perform better monitoring and counseling functions.  
However, some authors have tried to break this paradigm, by offering a number of 
explanations. Hart (1995) argues that given that outside directors do not have a significant financial 
interest in the company, and would have little to gain from increase in the firm’s performance, they 
are less effective monitors than one would expect. Moreover, outside directors are busy people (Fich 
& Shivdasanti, 2006) and consequentially do not have the necessary resources to devote to the focal 
company. Finally, outside directors may owe their position to the management team, and therefore 
would be highly influenced by the CEO’s perspectives. 
Zahra and Pearce (1990) point out four – similar - practical limitations that may hinder the 
strategic involvement of outside directors and, therefore, their perceived value relative to inside 
directors. Firstly, demands of their other professional responsibilities may make it difficult to devote 
the necessary amount of time. Second, the risk of interlocking – outside directors adopting a 
collusive behavior to protect some hidden interest – increases with the representation of more 
outside directors. Third, since the CEO still plays an important role selecting outside directors, they 
are not fully independent from the management team. Lastly, it has been observed that when 
directors face some conflicting view with the management team, they are more inclined to resign 
instead of confronting.  
Westphal and Bednar (2005) approach the ineffectiveness of outside directors from the 
perspective of pluralistic ignorance. This phenomenon refers to the situation when even under 
conditions of low performance, there is a systematic tendency for outside directors to withhold their 
concerns about the firm and, consequentially, decreases the likelihood of initiating strategic changes 
in response to low performance. The independent variables, in order to explain pluralistic ignorance, 
are communication and social integration, both resulting from demographic homogeneity and dense 
friendship ties among group members. In that sense, it can be understood that having closer social 
proximity with other members is not always detrimental to the effectiveness of board of directors, 
but may mitigate the existence of pluralistic ignorance between them.  
CEO duality occurs when the same person holds both the CEO and the board chairperson 
positions in a corporation (Finkelstein & D´Aveni, 1994). The most commented aspect about this 
situation is that CEOs exert excessive influence on boards, what is referred as entrenched boards. It 
is widely accepted that the separation of the CEO and the chair of the board help to improve board 
monitoring effectiveness (Klein, 1998).   
So far corporate governance literature in relation to control and performance has covered 
topics such as leadership structure inside/outside director (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007), board 
hierarchy (Huse, 2007; He & Huang, 2011); and alignment of executive compensation (Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 1999; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002). This article moves forwards the discussing the effect 
stricter governance and financial performance in the Brazilian context. 
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3. Methods 
The research question of this paper is do Brazilian companies with a stricter governance 
control and monitoring system perform better than others? In order to answer this question 116 
companies were assessed. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – 
Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” 
refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to 
follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011).  
Some of the requirements of the title “Novo Mercado” are: equity composed exclusively by 
voting shares, board of directors composed by minimum five directors, being 20% independent 
directors, disclosure of financial statements on a quarterly basis according to an accounting 
standard, minimum 25% of the shares in the free float market, among others (BM&F, 2011).  
In order to assess the level of control the board of directors has over the management team, 
the 116 companies were assessed according to four parameters: percentage of independent 
directors (Weisbach, 1988; Borokhovic & Parrino, 1996; Fama & Jensen, 1983), the separation of 
chairman and CEO (Rechner & Dalton, 1991), the adoption of contingent compensation (Westphal, 
1999) and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership breakdown (Finkelstein & 
D´Aveni, 1994).  All the data is public information and was acquired through investor relation 
websites.  
After assessing the companies in respect to these four parameters, companies were scored 
with final amount of points, which measures the independence level between the top management 
team and the board of directors. In that way, the final board of directors’ power relative to the CEOs 
is easily measured in one standardized variable. The financial return of each firm is measured as the 
Return on Assets (ROA), from information published in the latest quarterly earnings release in 2012.  
The selection of ROA as the financial measure was based on the widely acceptance of this 
indicator as a short-term performance appraise (Finkelstein & D´Aveni, 1994; Westphal, 1999; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Given that the expected return on assets is highly dependent on the 
industry that the company operates, the sample of 116 companies was also categorized by 
industries, being this information obtained by BM&F classification. BM&F categorizes companies by 
three levels: economic sector, subsector and segment. Therefore, the results analyses are explored 
from this perspective.   
 
 
Figure 1 - Inverted curvilinear shape between control and financial return (ROA) 
Note: Source: Elaborated by authors 
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The aggregated score each company can be attributed is between 2 and 12. In the scale, 2 
represents the least independent board, while 12 refers to the case in which the board is highly 
independent from the top management team.  Given that this paper argues that a balance between 
collaboration and control between board of directors and top management team leads to higher 
financial return, inverted curvilinear relationship logic is applied. On other words, the higher the 
synergy between board and top management team the higher the financial performance, balance 
between board of directors and top management team is our proxy for stricter control. Figure 1 
summarizes this idea.  
The curvilinear shape of the scale has been based on an article written by Golden and Zajac 
(2001), in which the authors advocate that the extremely divided conceptualization of boards as 
passive or active hide some nuances of the relationship between top management team and board 
of directors. In other words, depending on the current situation that a company faces at the moment, 
in respect to the level of monitoring and board strategic involvement, changes such as increasing 
outside directors and the tenure of the members may be beneficial or detrimental.  
Parameters utilized were outside directors, CEO Duality, contingent compensation and 
institutional investor ownership. The scale for outside directors has been structured in the following 
manner. The title of “Novo Mercado” imposes that companies´ board have at least 20% of 
independent outsiders. Therefore, there are 80 points to be distributed accordingly, referring to the 
percentage between 20% and 100%. In that sense, aiming at providing the same level of relevance 
as the other parameters, the maximum points attributed will be 3 and the minimum one. The 
division is presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Scale of Percentage of Outside Directors 
 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors 
 
The study of CEO duality – referring to the situation in which the chair of the board and the 
executive command are occupied by the same person - makes it apparent that it is not easy to 
simultaneously establish unity of command at the top and avoid CEO entrenchment (Finkelstein & 
D´Aveni, 1994). Following previous work, this variable will be treated as a dichotomous. In that 
sense, it will be attributed zero point for the situation which the CEO is the chairman and 3 for the 
opposite situation (Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  
Contingent compensation refers to the share of compensation that depends upon the 
achievement of specific performance goals (Westphal, 1999). Although contingent compensation is 
likely to align interests between shareholders and top management team and, therefore, could be 
seen as an efficient mechanism to reduce agency problems, it also presents some drawbacks. 
Specifically, linking manager compensation too closely to firm wealth might lead risk avoiding 
behavior on the part of the agent (Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Therefore, given this tricky situation of 
determining what is “too closely”, this variable seems to fit the inverted curvilinear shape of the 
scale. Table 2 summarizes the score attributed to each company in respect to contingent 
compensation. It is important to note that answering according to this system, this parameter also 
has the same level of relevance, as the maximum is three points. 
 
 
 
% of Outside Directors Points 
0 – 20% Less than minimum required for “Novo Mercado” 
21%  – 46% 1 
47%  – 73% 2 
74% - 100% 3 
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Table 2 
Scale for Contingent Compensation 
 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors 
 
The category of “Novo Mercado” demands that at least 25% of the shares are traded in the 
free float market. Therefore, there are 75 points, referring to 0% to 75% that can be divided into 
three equal clusters. In that sense, this parameter also has the same level of importance as the ones 
before, namely, maximum of three points. Table 3 presents this division for institutional investors.  
 
Table 3 
Scale Institutional Investor Ownership 
 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors 
 
Having scored the companies in respect to the described scale, analyses were performed. The 
first set of analysis assesses how much the CEO relative power score scale grasps the expected 
financial return of a company. In other words, two regression  analyses are initially conducted, 
grounded in the developed scale of this paper: firstly, the individual score of each parameter and the 
financial return measured in terms of ROA; secondly, the CEO relative power score (aggregated 
score). 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
Table 4 comprises an extensive analysis of the results of the four measured parameters of CEO 
relative power. The percentage of independent outsiders already sends a clear message, as the vast 
Contingent Compensation   Points 
Does the company make use of 
contingent compensation for the CEO?  
Yes 1 
No 0 
Does the company make use of 
contingent compensation for the 
directors?  
Yes 1 
No 0 
Does the company disclose the level 
of contingent compensation in annual 
reports or other communication 
vehicle?  
Yes 1 
No 0 
 
% of Institutional investor 
ownership 
Points 
Up to 25% 1 
26% - 50% 2 
51% – 75% 3 
More than 75% 
Less than  minimum required by “Novo 
Mercado” 
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majority of the companies - 83.6% - adopt between 21% and 46% of the outsiders. In that way, they 
only operate one level above the required percentage of 20% and fifteen percentile points, given 
that the overall average of independent outsiders is 35%.  From this initial understanding, it is 
possible to affirm that given the already strict rules imposed by the category “Novo Mercado”, 
companies very rarely push beyond this level. In other words, they do not overemphasize corporate 
governance as a mechanism to further protect shareholders ‘interest or increase the financial return, 
but they are rather shaped by the regulatory system. 
 
Table 4 
Overview CEO Relative Power – Per Parameter 
 
Note. Source: Based on secondary data gathering elaborated by the authors. 
 
In respect to the existence of CEO duality, almost three quarters of the companies do not hold 
a situation in which the CEO also performs the role of chairman of the board. The case of CEO duality 
most commonly happens in partially owned family companies, such as Arezzo, Cia Hering and JHSF 
Participações. The literature proposes that CEO duality can be beneficial when the company is facing 
a difficult financial situation, as this sends a message to the market of who is in charge of the “ship” 
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(Finkelstein & D´Aveni, 1994). However, at this point it is important to note that the average return 
on assets performed by the cluster of companies that hold a CEO duality is 6.22%, while the overall 
average is 6.36%. Therefore, this argumentation does not seem to apply here.  
Contingent compensation is an additional mechanism to align top management team interests 
and shareholders‘ interests. The sample illustrates that this tool is widely applied for both CEOs and 
directors: 60% and 56%, respectively, of the companies use contingent compensation for chief 
executive officers and directors. In respect to disclosing the level of contingent compensation – 
usually published in annual reports and in the ownership breakdown, in cases in which the top 
management team and directors hold a part of the shares – 70% of the companies adopt this 
practice.  
A more interesting analysis of the adoption of contingent compensation occurs when 
aggregating the answer of the three questions, so it is possible to observe how companies behave 
simultaneously to these three matters. In that sense, almost one quarter of the sample do not adopt 
any of these practices, namely, using contingent compensation for CEOs, directors and disclosing the 
level of contingent compensation adopted. Table 4 illustrates that 24% of the companies scored zero 
points. One level up, there are 18% of the companies that have been assessed with one point, which 
means that out of the three potential practices from contingent compensation, they adopt one of 
them. The number of companies with two points in this parameter calls attention: only 6% of sample 
has been scored two points, which implies that a normal distribution cannot be observed in this 
parameter. Lastly, slightly over the majority of the companies scored 3 points, which means that 
they adopt contingent compensation for CEOs, directors and also disclose the level of compensation 
applied in each case. It is noteworthy that three quarters of the sample scored in the extremes of the 
scale – either zero or three points – triggering the question of whether companies perceive the value 
of contingent compensation only when the mechanism is fully put in practice.  
Many companies adopt contingent compensation practices seeking for legitimacy, rather than 
considering technical improvements (Zucker, 1977). In that way, bearing in mind the two extremes 
that companies operate (either scoring zero or three points in this parameter), it seems that this 
Zucker´s theory can be observed.  
It has been expressed that contingent compensation – especially in the form of long term 
incentive plan (LTIP) – is more efficient and should be further applied when the financial performance 
is different than the expected one (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  In that sense, we could assume that the 
financial return for the cluster of companies that scored three points in this parameter is lower than 
the financial return of companies that score zero points. It is important to bear in mind that given 
some sample limitation – the amount of companies that scored three is more than the double than 
the amount of companies that scored zero – statically it is not possible perform a test to prove this 
hypothesis.   
Lastly, the parameter of percentage of institutional investor indicates that 64% of the sample 
holds ownership structures that are on the upper limit allowed by Bovespa. According to “Novo 
Mercado” rules, companies are required to have at least 25% of the shares in the free floating 
market. This requirement is based on the logic that liquidity is highly important to stock exchanges, 
as it attracts more capital and investors, boosting the country´s economy (BM&F, 2011). The 
average of the cluster of companies that scored three in this parameter is 65%, while the overall 
average of the sample is 61%. On the other extreme, it is noteworthy that less than 5% of the 
companies adopt a less concentrated capital structure, in the case of having less than 25% of the 
capital represented by institutional investors.  
From observing Table 5 a couple of comments can be drawn. Firstly, despite the significant 
increase in the result of Multiple R, it is still low (35.55%) in statistics terms. Another important point 
to mention is that among the thirteen variables included in this regression (ten dummy variables and 
three continuous variables), only two presented a p-value lower than 10%, the significance level 
adopted to test the hypothesis. In this sense, only the variables “board composed by 20% of 
independent directors” and the “percentage of institutional investor” were meaningful in statistics 
terms to explain the financial return. 
It is important to highlight that two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage 
of institutional investors) have a p-value lower than 10%, which indicates that they are significant 
when explaining the financial return of the selected sample. Moreover, both of the variables have a 
negative coefficient with the dependent variable – financial return measured in terms of ROA – which 
partly corroborates the research question of this paper.  
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis with all Dummy Variables 
 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors 
 
In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – 
stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that 
the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership 
by institutional investor might actually led to worse performance. Although only two of the previously 
selected four parameters have proven to be significant and with negative coefficient with financial 
return, this paper can be considered a first attempt to demystify the widely accepted governance 
superiority paradigm, in the sense that stricter governance control and performance are not closely 
related.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aimed at examining the relationship between governance structures perceived to 
be stricter – in respect to the level of control and monitor – and the financial return of the companies. 
The underlying reasoning is that not necessarily more sophisticated governance structures in regard 
to control will lead to higher financial return, given that some other aspects, such as collaboration 
and trust among the top management team and the board of directors although crucial, are still 
neglected (Zahra & Pearce, 1990).  
The percentage of independent outsiders sends a clear message, as the vast majority of the 
companies – 83.6% - adopt between 21% and 46% of the outsiders. In that way, they only operate 
one level above the required percentage of 20%. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that given the 
already strict rules imposed by the category “Novo Mercado”, companies very rarely push beyond 
this level and are rather shaped by the regulatory system.  
In respect to the existence of CEO duality, almost three quarters of the companies do not hold 
a situation in which the CEO also performs the role of chairman of the board. The literature proposes 
that CEO duality can be beneficial when the company is facing a difficult financial situation, as this 
sends a message to the market of who is in charge of the “ship” (Finkelstein & D´Aveni, 1994). 
However, as it was presented, given that the average return on assets performed by the cluster of 
companies that hold a CEO duality is 6.22%, while the overall average is 6.36%, this argumentation 
does not seem to apply here.  
The observed trend in contingent compensation also has some theoretical background support. 
It was noticeable how the majority of the companies scored either the maximum of minimum points, 
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which might refer to the fact that when engaged in this type of practice, companies are also seeking 
for legitimacy, and not only focusing on technical improvements (Zucker, 1977).   
Finally, the percentage of institutional investor in the ownership breakdown showed that the 
sample average was 61%, while the maximum allowed by “Novo Mercado” rules is 75%.  
Given the problem of multicollinearity, the final multiple R obtained is still statistically low, 
28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the 
complex reality of organizations. As mentioned earlier, some extremely important aspects of 
governance structures, such as selection of new CEO (Westphal, 1999); CEO tenure and directors 
tenure (Zahra & Pearce, 1990); demographic distance (Westphal & Bednar, 2005); and amount and 
frequency of committee were not included in the analysis, which might the reason to low multiple R.  
Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of 
outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, 
with p-value lower than 10%.  In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often 
portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has 
provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside 
directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse 
performance. Although only two of the previously selected four parameters have proven to be 
significant and with negative coefficient with financial return, this paper can be considered a first 
attempt to demystify the widely accepted governance superiority paradigm, in the sense that stricter 
governance control and performance do not follow the behavior exhaustively described in the 
literature. The reason why outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor 
might actually lead to worse performance is not clear. Future studies could try to understand the 
reasons for this paradox specially in the Brazilian setting. 
 
Notes 
1. Authors wish to thanks two anonymous reviewers. 
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